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A tradable development rights (TDR) program focusing on biodiversity conservation faces a 
crucial problem: defining which areas of habitat should be considered equivalent. Restricting the 
trading domain to a narrow area could boost the range of biodiversity conserved but could 
increase the opportunity cost of conservation. 
The issue is relevant to Brazil, where TDR-like programs are emerging. Current regulations 
require each rural property to maintain a forest reserve of at least 20 percent, but nascent policies 
allow some tradability of this obligation. This paper uses a simple, spatially explicit model to 
simulate a hypothetical state-level program. We find that wider trading domains drastically 
reduce landholder costs of complying with this regulation and result in environmentally 
preferable landscapes. 
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Habitat conservation can be justified on instrumental or intrinsic grounds. The instrumental 
approach seeks ways to finance conservation of habitats that perform particular “bankable” 
services such as watershed protection or carbon storage (see e.g., Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-
Mills 2002). If successful, this approach will create incentives to preserve some, but not all, 
habitats. It will promote conservation of moist hillside forests, for instance, and tend to neglect 
dry forests on plains—even if the latter contain unique biological features.  
An alternative approach assumes a moral imperative to preserve viable examples of every type of 
natural habitat. Arguing from a well-established log-log relationship between habitat area and 
number of species, conservation biologists sometimes advocate a goal of retaining a fixed 
proportion—ten percent or more—of each habitat type. (Soulé and Sanjayan 1998) In many 
areas, this goal will not be met without active interventions to protect habitats from agricultural 
expansion. The costs of these interventions will vary widely, depending on agricultural potential 
and opportunities. In the developing world, the opportunity cost of conservation may be a few 
hundred dollars per hectare where the alternative is extensive pasture management, or thousands 
of dollars where the alternative is a high-value perennial crop. 
In principle, a transferable development rights (TDRs) program can minimize the social cost of 
achieving a target for area conserved, and can reward those undertaking conservation. Such 
programs have been used on a small scale in the United States to preserve farmland and natural Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 4 
 
areas. (Johnston and Madison 1997) On a larger scale, a government could allocate development 
or conversion rights (denominated in hectares) equivalent to 80 percent of a particular habitat. 
Trading of these rights would tend to allow conversion of the plots most suitable for agriculture, 
and retention under natural vegetation of the areas with the lowest opportunity cost. If the rights 
were freely and equally allocated among property holders (a fiscally inefficient but politically 
expedient procedure), those who maintained forests would profit from TDR sales. A TDR 
program is thus the conservation analog of environmental permit programs that regulate air 
pollution or fisheries access. 
The implementers of a TDR program focusing specifically on biodiversity representation face a 
crucial practical problem: defining which areas of habitat should be considered equivalent and 
substitutable
1. Science can provide input to this policy question, but cannot decide it. Forests (or 
other habitats) can be classified according to a detailed taxonomic hierarchy. Environmental 
policymakers may differ in their views on how far down the hierarchy to go in determining 
equivalence. “Lumpers” will favor equivalence within high level classifications, allowing 
substitutability among all neotropical forests, for instance. “Splitters” of different degrees of 
rigor will favor restricting forest substitutability to finer classifications, for instance, particular 
types of neotropical forests (e.g., moist neotropical rainforests), forest subtypes based on unique 
assemblages of species and communities (e.g., the Atlantic Rainforest of Brazil), forests within 
particular watersheds, or at the limit, forests within a particular microwatershed of a few 
thousand hectares. Choice of the appropriate level involves a tradeoff between the efficiency 
gains offered by a broad classification, and the potentially greater representation of biodiversity Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 5 
 
offered by a fine classification. (Consideration of environmental goals other than biodiversity, 
such as maintenance of hydrological processes, would complicate the tradeoff.) 
This issue is of particular relevance to Brazil, where TDR-like programs are emerging. A long-
standing regulation
2 in Brazil requires each landowner to maintain a proportion of each property 
under natural vegetation as a legal forest reserve. The proportion ranges from 20 percent in 
southern Brazil to 80 percent in the Legal Amazon
3. Recent provisional regulations allow 
landholders to satisfy the requirement for one property through legal forest reserve located on 
another. In some cases, the off-site legal reserve may be owned by another party, opening the 
way to a market in legal reserve rights.  
This paper uses a simulation model to examine the impacts of alternative trading domains on 
landholder compliance cost and on protection of areas of biodiversity interest. It uses data for the 
Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, an innovator in the use of economic instruments for 
conservation. It significantly extends an earlier paper (Chomitz 2004) through improved 
measures of land value, finer geographic resolution, and a wider range of impact measures. 
While we believe that the results are indicative, we stress that this paper is not intended as an 
authoritative analysis for Minas Gerais. However, we hope that with further refinements, the 
model presented here could allow policymakers and stakeholders in Minas Gerais, in Brazil, and 
beyond to explore options and issues in policy design.  
The next section describes the current situation in Minas Gerais. The third presents a stylized 
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TDR schemes. The fourth section operationalizes the model. Section five presents our results 
with some discussion, and we end with some final comments. 
II.  BRAZILIAN AND MINAS GERAIS CONTEXT 
Since 1965, Brazilian landholders have been obliged to keep a specified proportion of each 
property under natural vegetation. Currently, this “legal forest reserve” requirement is 20 percent 
in southern states—where much forest cover has been lost—and 80 percent in the forest-biome 
(e.g., non-savanna) areas of the Legal Amazon. Proprietors may use the legal reserve area for 
limited purposes, including sustainable extraction, but may not clear-cut it. The legal reserve 
requirement is additional to another regulation that places under “permanent protection” forested 
areas on hills or bordering streams and rivers.  
Enforcing compliance with the legal reserve regulation is challenging in some southern states, 
where aggregate forest cover has been lost as a result of centuries of agricultural expansion, with 
much deforestation occurring in recent decades. In many locales, aggregate forest cover has 
dropped well below the 20 percent limit because of profitable opportunities to cultivate 
soybeans, vegetables, coffee, or other crops. Strict enforcement of the legal reserve requirement 
would be extremely expensive in these locales if landholders were required to abandon cropland 
or perennials. In heavily-worked properties with little remaining natural vegetation, the rate and 
quality of natural regeneration might be extremely slow. The isolated and poor-quality stands of 
regenerated vegetation would provide little biodiversity benefit. In other locales, some forest 
fragments persist. Often, these fragments represent the last vestiges of the Brazilian Atlantic Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 7 
 
Forest, a biome that is now reduced to about 7 percent of its original area and consequently 
harbors important biodiversity found nowhere else (Myers et al 2000). In Minas Gerais, the 
Atlantic Forest in 1995 had shrunk to 4.2 percent of its original area (Fundação SOS Mata 
Atlântica 1998). These fragments represent the candidates for nuclei of a regenerated forest, 
because of the potential to serve as genetic sources for endangered plants and animals. Yet 
deforestation continues in these forest fragments (Fundação SOS Mata Atlântica 1998) because 
returns to agricultural conversion and timber extraction exceed the private benefits of forest 
maintenance. The legal reserve regulation, by itself, would permit deforestation down to the 20 
percent limit, though special regulations restrict deforestation in the Atlantic Forest zone. 
In short, strict property-by-property enforcement of the legal reserve limit might be ecologically 
and economically inefficient in already-deforested regions. Property-wise enforcement would 
impose large compliance costs on profitable farms, with little environmental gain. Property-wise 
enforcement would fail to provide incentives to maintain and expand the precious remaining 
areas of primary habitat.  
Consequently, as enforcement effort was stepped up in the late 1990s, there was increased 
attention to mechanisms that would allow out-of-compliance landholders to meet their legal 
reserve limits offsite. In the municipality of Araguarí, in the state of Minas Gerais, local 
prosecutors in 1997 allowed groups of coffee farmers, with no remaining forest on their 
properties, to form a “condominium” to purchase and preserve a large forested property 
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“compensation” procedures. The regulation has been repeatedly renewed, and contains a 
provision that specifies that compensation take place within the same microbasin if possible; and 
if not, in the same river basin and state
4. In 2002, Minas Gerais adopted a new state forest code, 
which allows for trading of legal reserve within a microbasin, but allows for some forms of legal 
reserve offset within a river basin. A more elaborate system of legal reserve enforcement and 
trading, SISLEG, was put in place in 2000 in the state of Paraná. (Keare and Barrows 2002) Each 
property in the state is required to come into compliance with the legal reserve requirement by 
the end of 2018. This can be done through on-site regeneration, with forested property of the 
same owner, or with forested property of a different owner. Cross-property compensation must 
take place within one of ten zones defined on the basis of river basins. 
Forest reserve maintenance is particularly relevant to Minas Gerais. After suffering substantial 
forest loss, the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais has become an innovator in forest conservation. 
Over the past 50 years, forests in this large territory have been cleared to accommodate 
agricultural expansion and to fuel the state’s charcoal-fired iron mills. Forest loss has been 
particularly severe in the Atlantic Forest region of the state, in the areas near the blast furnaces, 
and in the fertile “Triangulo” region in the west. In response, during the 1990s the state adopted 
two major conservation initiatives: a ban on the use of native forests for iron production, and a 
revenue-sharing system that rewarded municípios (the equivalent of counties) for creating and 
maintaining protected areas. Nonetheless, parks and reserves constitute only 0.9 percent of the 
state’s territory; another 2.3 percent of the territory is in multiple use with some degree of Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 9 
 
environmental zoning (Costa et al 1998). Management of legal forest reserves on private lands is 
therefore of great significance to the state’s overall forest estate. 
Figure 1 shows remaining forest cover on private agricultural lands, based on municipio-level 
tabulations from the agricultural census of 1995/96 (IBGE 1998). The state is divided into four 
biomes, the major ones being the Atlantic Forest to the east, the cerrado or savanna to the west, 
and the caatinga in the drier north (Figure 2). Remaining forest cover is below 20 percent in most 
of the Atlantic Forest biome and in the agroclimatically favorable portions of the cerrado, to the 
south and west. Higher forest cover remains in the more arid and remote regions of the cerrado 




III. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE APPLICATION OF A TDR SCHEME TO FOREST 
REGENERATION 
 
In areas with inadequate forest cover, the TDR scheme is a device to encourage protection of 
existing forest and regeneration of new forest. To evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness in 
doing so, we introduce a highly stylized model. Initially, a landholder has a property with total 
area T, of which A0 is in agriculture and F0 in forest. Then, a regulation is introduced (or 
enforced) requiring the landholder to set aside a proportion ϕ of her property as forest reserve, Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 10 
 
first from existing forest, and then if necessary by abandoning cultivated land and pasture to 
forest regrowth. Let g(x) represent the total value of the most valuable x hectares of cultivated 
land, and h(x) the total value of the most valuable x hectares of forest land. We make the drastic 
assumption that forest reserve has no private value due to restrictions on use
6. Then compliance 
with the regulation costs the landholder: 
h(F0)-h(F0- ϕT)     (F0>ϕT) 
h(F0) +[g(A0)-g(A0-(ϕT-F0))]    (ϕT>F0) 
Regrowth occurs entirely on properties with low initial forest cover. Because these properties are 
likely to be the most productive and heavily worked, compliance costs are high, and the quality 
of regenerated forest likely to be low, due to compacted soil, nutrient depletion, and absence of 
seed sources
 7. 
Now suppose that landholders are allowed to sell forest reserve rights attached to ‘excess’ forest 
(that is, forest areas in excess of ϕT) and that those with forest reserve deficits may purchase 
these rights and apply them to their own reserve obligations. This creates a market for forest 
reserve with market-clearing price p. The landholder’s problem is to satisfy the legal reserve 
requirement by choosing an agricultural abandonment area 0 ≤ a ≤A0, an on-site forest set-aside 
area 0 ≤ f≤F0 and a net legal reserve purchase area q (q<0 implies a sale of legal reserve rights) to 
maximize: 
g(A0-a)+h(F0-f)-pq Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 11 
 
subject to : 
a+f+q≥ϕT 
The maximization problem will differ between forest-deficit and forest surplus properties, 
depending on some additional assumptions about allowable transactions. 
Forest-deficit properties. First consider the response of properties where F0 -ϕT <0. Suppose for 
simplicity (and reflecting likely legislation) that forest-deficit properties are required to place all 
existing forest under reserve (f=F0), and are not permitted to sell permits through forest 
generated by land abandonment. Their optimization problem is: 
choose a to max g(A0-a) -p∙(ϕT-a-F0) 
where the second term reflects the cost of purchasing permits, and the amount of permits is 
determined by the choice of a. When p<g’(A0), compliance is achieved entirely through purchase 
of permits. When p> g’(A0-(ϕT-F0)), compliance is achieved entirely through abandonment of 
land. For intermediate values of p there is both abandonment and purchase, with g’(A0-a)= p. 
Forest surplus properties. If forest surplus properties are not permitted to sell permits based on 
agricultural land abandonment, then they choose f to maximize: 
h(F0-f)+ p∙(f-ϕT) Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 12 
 
where the second term reflects the potential revenue from sale of ‘excess’ reserve. Forest-surplus 
properties will convert all of their excess forest to farmland if p < h’(F0 – ϕT). They will sell all 
their surplus equal to F0 – ϕT if p > h’(0). For intermediate values of p, they sell F0 > f > ϕT 
satisfying p = h’(F0 – f). Whether sale of forest reserve rights constitutes an environmental gain 
depends on one’s evaluation of the likelihood that this land would otherwise have eventually 
been converted or degraded in the future, and how irreversible that action would be. Positive 
land values for forests suggest that the option of future conversion is privately valuable, so that 
retirement of this option may be socially valuable if environmental benefits are taken into 
account.  
If properties are allowed to sell permits based on agricultural land abandonment, then they 
choose both f and a to maximize 
g(A0-a)+h(F0-f )- p(ϕT- a+f) 
where there will be interior or corner solutions similar to those of the previous two cases. Here 
there could be an environmental gain if regeneration on these plots is vigorous and biodiverse 
due to the proximity of seed sources. 
This simple model suggests that the environmental and economic impacts of a TDR scheme 
depend on whether land values and land cover vary substantially within areas deemed 
biologically homogeneous. Suppose, for instance, that agroclimatic conditions determine both 
land value and biodiversity. Areas favorable to agriculture will have distinct biota, but will tend Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 13 
 
to have low remaining forest cover and high land value. Demand for reserve rights will be high, 
but few properties will have surplus forest with which to supply that demand. Suppose on the 
other hand that land values are determined mainly by road access, and that there is substantial 
variation in road access within biologically homogeneous areas. In this case there are substantial 
gains from trade possible. 
Environmental impacts also depend greatly on how the new scheme treats existing forest. If 
conversion of existing forest is allowed, especially in forest-deficit areas, then the TDR scheme 
could lead to loss of rare old-growth forests and its substitution by lower-quality regenerated 
forest.  Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 14 
 
IV. SIMULATION MODEL 
Data 
Land value. Land value data were kindly provided by Fundação Getulio Vargas. These 
data, collected semiannually, represent typical land sales transactions values by municipio for 
rural land sales, classified by land cover: crops, pasture, fields (campo) and forest. We chose 
second semester 1996 as the base period. Where observations were missing for this period, 
values were imputed using data from other periods, adjusted by average interperiod price change. 
Where data were missing for all periods, values were imputed from the average of neighboring 
municipios.  
Land cover. The Censo Agropecuário 1995–96 (IBGE 1998) breaks down land use 
within agricultural establishments into the following categories: natural forest, planted forest, 
perennials, annuals, planted pasture, native pasture, short fallow, productive unutilized (probably 
long fallow), and nonproductive (e.g., rocks, water, paved areas). IBGE kindly provided us with 
these data at the level of the census tract; there are 8,123 census tracts in 756 municípios. To link 
land use data with land value data, we adopted the following rough concordance:  
Censo Agropecuario classification  FGV classification 
natural forest  forest (matas) 
perennials, annuals, planted forest  crops (lavouras) 
planted pasture, short fallow, productive 
non-utilized 
pasture 
natural pasture  campo Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 15 
 
Biodiversity priority areas. Biodiversity priority areas for the state were identified 
through a process described in Costa et al (1998). A 15–month process involving 121 experts 
identified conservation priority areas on the basis of species richness, species endemicity and 
distribution, threat, and presence of special biological characteristics. Priority maps were made 
for seven taxonomic groups and combined into a summary map (at a scale of 1:1,700,000) 
indicating four degrees of importance. 
Demand and Supply at the Micro Level 
Here we adapt the theoretical model of section 3 to the available data. The unit of observation is 
the census tract. Census tract i in município j has Tij total hectares in agricultural establishments 
(excluding unproductive land), of which Fij is in forest, Aij in crops, Cij in native pasture, and Dij 
in planted pasture. We assume that, within each of these land uses, land is of homogeneous 
quality within município j and has value per hectare Vkj, where k indexes land use. We assume 
that properties within the census tract can pool their forest holdings for the purpose of satisfying 
the legal reserve requirement. If fij = Fij / Tij < 0.2, then the unit is out of compliance by a gap G 
= 0.2 Ti – Fi. Within the census tract, it can come into compliance either by purchasing legal 
reserve rights or by abandoning productive land to forest regrowth.
8 It chooses the least costly 
strategy, abandoning successively higher cost land until the opportunity cost of abandonment is 
the same as the price of legal reserve. We will assume that out-of-compliance properties are not 
permitted to use natural regeneration to create “excess” legal reserve for sale. 
Let qij(p) be the cumulative nonforest area in tract ij with value per hectare less than p. This 
distribution is approximated by constructing a step function based on Aij, Cij, and Dij together Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 16 
 
with their corresponding average values Vaj, Vcj, Vdj. For instance, where Vcj< Vdj < Vaj , the 
inverse of q(.) is given by: 
p= Vcj   [0<q< Cij] 
p= Vdj    [Cij<q< Cij+ Dij] 
p= Vaj    [ Cij+ Dij<q< Cij+ Dij+ Aij] 
 This crude approximation assumes that heterogeneity in land quality among farms within a 
município is reflected in different allocations of land use rather than in different average 
valuations of land devoted to particular land uses. 
The tract’s demand for legal reserve at price p is dij(p) = max[0, G – qij(p)]. When fij > 0.2, the 
census tract is a potential supplier of legal reserve. The supply function is simply sij(p) = 0, if p 
< Vfj, and equals Fij – 0.2T, if p > Vfj. 
In areas where the aggregate proportion of native forest falls below 20 percent, long-term 
ecosystem viability may depend on expanding the size of forest patches through natural 
regeneration of adjacent areas. It may therefore be desirable to allow properties (census tracts) 
that already have substantial forest cover to supply additional forest reserve through 
abandonment and regeneration. Supposing that this option is limited to census tracts with fij > 
0.2, the additional supply is given by s
add
ij(p) = qij(p). Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 17 
 
Solving for Market Equilibrium and its Impacts 
Aggregation of sij(p) and dij(p) over any specified trading domain yields estimates of the 
aggregate supply and demand curves S(p) and D(p). The calculated supply and demand functions 
are biased approximations of the actual functions. The crude imputation of land values used here 
does not take account of heterogeneity of land quality. Nor does it allow for the likely 
relationship between land cover and land value. Areas with relatively high forest cover are likely 
to be areas where agricultural potential, and hence land values, are low. (It is for this reason that 
the forest is still standing.) Hence the derived supply and demand functions are likely to differ 
systematically from the true functions, with less supply at low prices and less demand at high 
prices. This bias should be kept in mind when assessing model results. 
Equating supply and demand yields an equilibrium price p* and quantity Q*. Substitution of 
equilibrium price into a census tract’s supply and demand functions allows computation of legal 
reserve bought and sold, expenditures and revenues related to these transactions, of forest area 
newly-protected as legal reserve, and of areas abandoned to regeneration. 
Economic and environmental effects are assessed relative to an assumed ‘command-and-control’ 
baseline scenario. In the baseline case, the legal reserve requirement is enforced on a property-
wise basis without trading. In the baseline, we assume that areas with more than 20 percent forest 
eventually reduce forest cover to the legal limit (except in the Atlantic Forest biome where 
deforestation is forbidden),
9 and that areas that are out of compliance use unassisted natural 
regrowth on abandoned land to come into compliance. Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 18 
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The hypothetical TDR program potentially benefits the environment by encouraging the 
conservation and expansion of forest fragments in forest-rich locales. In the baseline scenario, 
these ecologically valuable areas are allowed to degrade down to the 20 percent limit, while 
areas that are already severely degraded are allowed to present very poor-quality regeneration to 
fulfill their reserve requirement. (The regeneration in these areas is likely to be poor because 
seed sources are lacking and the land has been heavily worked). In the program scenario, 
standing forest is conserved, and regrowth is encouraged near the forest, where seed sources are 
plentiful, and the opportunity to reconnect forest fragments is greater. This should lead to higher 
biomass and carbon densities, and to ecosystems better to support minimum viable populations 
of flora and fauna. Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 19 
 
  
To compute biodiversity impacts, municipio-level impacts were proportionately allocated to 
biodiversity priority areas that overlapped with the municipio. (Unfortunately the census-tract 
level data were not spatially referenced.)  
V. RESULTS 
Table 1 compares the impacts of alternative enforcement scenarios, relative to a baseline of no 
enforcement of the forest reserve regulation. In the command and control scenario, no trading of 
forest reserve permits is allowed. Successive scenarios allow trading within expanding 
geographic domains: municipio, biome X river basin combination, biome. Within each of the 
geographic trading regimes, two sub-scenarios are simulated. In ‘forest only’, forest surplus 
properties may sell permits based only on existing ‘excess’ forest. In the ‘forest first’ scenarios, 
forest surplus properties may also sell permits from abandonment and regrowth on agricultural 
plots, but only after selling all available permits based on standing forest.  
In the command and control scenario, out-of-compliance landholders come into compliance by 
abandoning 3,146,000 hectares of farmland, at an opportunity cost of R$1.47 billion. All of this 
is assumed to become low quality regeneration. The municipio-level trading scenarios offer 
negligible reductions in total compliance cost, as within-municipio trading opportunities are few. 
(This reflects to some degree the assumption of homogeneous land prices, for a given land use 
type, within municipios, but also the observed infrequency of coexisting forest-deficit and forest-Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 20 
 
surplus census tracts within the same municipio.) For the biome-basin scenario, however, trading 
makes a difference. In the forest-only sub-scenario, total compliance costs decline by R$256 
million relative to the command and control scenario. Forest-deficit properties capture about 45 
percent of this saving. The rest goes to forest-surplus properties, which sell permits based on 
346,000 forest hectares placed under new protection, and 250,000 hectares already protected (in 
theory) by regulations forbidding Atlantic Forest deforestation. In the forest-first subscenario of 
biome-basin trading, there is a further reduction of R$220 million in the social costs of 
compliance. The bulk of this accrues to the forest-deficit landholders, who now abandon only 
1,745,000 hectares, purchasing permits from 977,000 hectares of regenerating forest in favorable 
areas. Compared to the forest-only subscenario, new protection of existing forest drops from 
346,000 to 175,000 hectares. 
In the final pair of scenarios, trading is permitted throughout a biome. The forest-only variant 
shows relatively little difference in the land cover mix from biome-basin trading: newly 
protected forest increases in area from 346,000 to 455,000 hectares. But by exploiting cross-
basin (but within-biome) differences in land value, the biome-wide trading scenario reduces 
costs by an additional R$284 million compared to biome-basin. Finally, compliance costs are 
drastically reduced in the final scenario, the forest-first variant of biome-wide trading. Compared 
to the command-and-control scenario, total opportunity costs are reduced by over R$1 billion, 
most of which accrues to forest-deficit landholders. The savings accompanies a massive shift of 
1.7 million hectares from land under low-quality regeneration to land under high-quality 
regeneration. Compared to the forest-only variant of biome-wide trading, this environmental Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 21 
 
benefit is slightly offset by a decline in new protection of standing forest, from 455,000 hectares 
to 275,000 hectares. Forest –surplus landholders realize reduced aggregate profits from permit 
sales in the forest-first variant, despite the much greater hectarage of permits delivered. 
Figure 4 summarizes the main results, showing only the forest-first variants. Expansion of the 
trading domain results in substantial social savings; both forest-deficit and forest-surplus 
landholders benefit as the domain expands. Wider trading also results in a better overall quality 
of new additions to the forest reserve system. Under command-and-control, the new reserves are 
entirely composed of low-quality regeneration. Much of this area will regenerate weakly, if at 
all, yielding little biodiversity or carbon sequestration benefit. Under biome-wide trading, low-
quality regeneration is reduced to just 29 percent of the expanded reserve area. This almost 
certainly implies some gain in carbon sequestration and improvement in biodiversity-friendly 
habitat. But does expansion of the trading domain lead to poor targeting or poor geographical 
balance in the biodiversity benefits?  
While enforcement of command-and-control protects an additional 486,000 hectares of poor-
quality regenerating land in biodiversity priority areas, biome-basin trading protects 668,000 new 
hectares in these areas (of which 427,000 is standing forest or high quality regeneration) and 
biome-wide trading protects 884,000 new hectares in biodiversity priority areas, mostly high-
quality. Figures 5 and 6 show how the geographic distribution of high quality forest (i.e., 
existing, and high quality regeneration) differs between biome-basin trading, and biome-wide 
trading. Biome-wide trading has large beneficial impacts on forest extent in the north and east of Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 22 
 
the state, both inside and outside biodiversity priority areas. Biome-basin trading yields superior 
results only in some small corners of the southwestern portion of the state. In this fertile 
agricultural area, permit prices soar to over R$1,100 per hectare when trading is restricted to the 
biome-basin combination, eliciting some supply from the few remaining forest-surplus tracts. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The simulation results show that a tradable development rights program could dramatically 
reduce the opportunity costs of protecting and regenerating a desired aggregate level of forest 
cover, when the trading domain extends beyond the strictly local area (e.g. municipio or micro-
watershed). Trading beyond the local level also results in superior environmental results, 
including greater protection of existing forest remnants, and encouragement of higher-quality 
regeneration. These outcomes should be better both for biodiversity and for carbon sequestration. 
These results may be generalizable to other forest-poor areas, since they follow from the strong 
association between favorable agroclimatic and market access conditions, high prior levels of 
forest conversion, and high land values, and high degrees of spatial autocorrelation in all these 
variables.  
Reduction in opportunity costs is important not just from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, 
but perhaps more importantly, from a political economy viewpoint. Much of the cost reductions 
would potentially accrue to large landholders in rich agricultural regions. But benefits also 
accrue to landholders in less prosperous regions who have protected their forests, and to 
agricultural workers. Together this builds a powerful constituency for instituting the program. Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 23 
 
Conversely, there would be little support for a command-and-control program that imposed costs 
on these stakeholder groups. 
How far should trading domains be extended? There cannot be a definitive answer, as the 
tradeoffs will be sensitive to the spatial covariance of biological distinctiveness and agricultural 
attractiveness – and to decisions about how to share the costs of conservation. But the results 
shown here suggest that wider domains deserve serious attention – at least in the context where 
forests are already depleted in high-market-value areas. Here the wider domain offers much 
greater aggregate environmental benefits and much greater social savings. The savings are large 
enough that a small portion could be used to finance targeted interventions (such as purchase of 
land for parks) in ecosystems that might otherwise be underrepresented. Similar considerations 
apply when considering whether to allow permit supply only from standing forest, or also from 
regeneration. Similarly, extending the trading regime to allow supply of permits from high-
quality regeneration ‘crowds out’ a small amount of protection of standing forest, but stimulates 
the creation of a much greater extent of restored forest, while realizing considerable savings. 
Again, in principle, some of the savings could be devoted to targeted acquisition of standing 
forest in underrepresented ecosystems. 
A deeper understanding of the potential for instituting tradable development rights programs 
requires two lines of investigation. First, modeling can be improved through more accurate 
representation of economic and ecological conditions and processes. Finer spatial detail on land 
values, more realistic modeling of ‘business as usual’ land use trends, and ecologically-informed Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 24 
 
modeling of the vigor of natural regeneration would all help. Second, implementation of these 
programs requires more investigation into the institutional mechanics of monitoring and 
enforcement, and the political economy of adoption.  
Perhaps the biggest question is whether such programs are feasible in places that lack Brazil’s 
tradition of a quantitative conservation requirement for every landholder. Certainly the existence 
of that tradition makes it easier to reach consensus on an initial allocation of permits. But it may 
also be possible to agree on such a rule in areas where forests have been widely cut despite legal 
prohibitions; or in forest-rich regions where publicly owned lands are only now coming under 
development pressure. In any case, the evolution of TDR-like systems in Brazil alone is reason 
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NOTES
                                                 
1 It has similarly proved difficult to operationalize wetland equivalence for the application of compensatory schemes 
for wetland mitigation. There, the problem is commensurating a wide range of distinct hydrological and biological 
functions. See Whigham 1999 and National Research Council 2001. 
2 The regulation was incorporated in the Forest Code of 1965, and had a precursor in the 1934 Code. 
3 Landholders are additionally required to maintain vegetation in areas of permanent preservation, which include 
riverbanks and slopes. 
4 Medida Provisória 2166–67, 24 August 2001 is the most recent versión. 
5 This is true in part by construction. Mean land values are computed as the weighted average of prices according to 
land class, with forest often being the least valuable class. 
6 Think of the value of existing, non-reserved forest as representing the sum of option values for agricultural use and 
the value of standing timber if liquidated immediately. This value may be large relative to the present value of a 
stream of sustainable forest harvests, particularly from newly regenerating forest. 
7 This generalization may not apply to areas under perennial crops or plantations, some of which may revert easily to 
forest if abandoned. 
8 We assume that such abandonment satisfies regulations, regardless of the actual quality of subsequent natural 
regeneration.  
9 Despite this law 7.3 percent of the remaining Atlantic Forest in Minas Gerais was deforested over 1990–95 
according to a remote sensing-based study (SOS Mata Atlântica 1998)  Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 27 
 
Table 1 Economic and environmental impacts of alternative scenarios 























             
Forest accounting  (Thousands of hectares. Baseline is 4.837 million hectares.)  
 Abandoned in deficit forest areas 3,146 3,024 2,861 2,551 1,745  2,441 904
 Leased in from surplus forest 
areas, of which: 
0 122 285 596 1,401 706 2,243
 - in forest but not currently 
protected 
0 51 40 346 175 455 275
 - non-forest land abandoned  0 0 174 0 977  0 1,717
 - in forest and already protected  0 71 71 250 250  251 251
Total existing forest protected 4,837 4,888 4,877 5,183 5,012  5,292 5,112
Forest and higher quality 
regeneration 
4,837 4,888 5,051 5,183 5,989 5,292 6,829
Forest and all regeneration  7,983 7,912 7,912 7,734 7,734 7,733 7,733
    
Biodiversity area preservation  (Thousands of hectares. Baseline is 1.075 million hectares.)  
 New, by abandonment in forest 
deficit areas 
486 453 403 384 241 423 235
 New, by leasing out in forest 
surplus areas 
0 33 82 182 427 215 649
 Total  1,561 1,561 1,561 1,642 1,743  1,713 1,959
    
Economic Values  (000s R$)            
 Opportunity cost of abandoned 
land in forest-deficit tracts 
1,469,252 1,426,453 1,359,157 1,147,322 797,980 813,857 131,146
 Expenditures on permits  0 28,387 91,010 206,439 376,571 469,274 478,925
 Profits from sales of permits  0 15,242 26,568 141,249 182,067 354,773 206,107
 Reduction in compliance costs 
for forest-deficit tracts 
0 14,413 19,094 114,432 293,642 184,791 859,760
 Total surplus  0 29,655 45,663 255,681 475,709 539,565 1,065,866
Notes:   
a) By law, property owners are required to leave 20 percent of their land in forest. Also, trees are not allowed to be cut in the Atlantic 
Forest biome. The baseline forest is calculated as the lesser of existing forest and 20 percent of productive land; except in the 
Atlantic Forest biome, where it is equal to the existing forest. 
(b) "Abandoned" refers to any land that was not in forest that is allowed to regenerate naturally to forest. We assume "strong 
regeneration" occurs in areas that have at least 20 percent of the potentially productive land currently in forest ("forest surplus 
areas"). Areas with less than 20 percent of the land in forest are called "forest deficit areas". 
(c) Under the trading regimes, the supply price of forested land in the Atlantic Forest biome is set 
to 0. 
 
(d) "In forest and already protected" represents forested land in the Atlantic Forest biome that is above the 20 percent required in 
other biomes. We allow sales of permits based on this forest. Chomitz, Thomas and Brandão   Page 28 
 
(e) Biodiversity area preserved is calculated by multiplying the area of abandonment (of deforested land) or protection of forested 
land, times the proportion of the municipio which is in a biodiversity priority area. The biodiversity area baseline is calculated from 
the baseline forest area. 
f) "Lost value from abandoning land" is computed as the area under the demand curve: the value of land in forest deficit areas. 
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Figure 5 “Good-quality” forest cover with biome-basin trading 
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